Biosecurity

Biological threats can arise from nature, accidents, or deliberate misuse, and advances in the life sciences are continually changing both the risks and the tools available to address them. My work focuses on how to reduce these risks without unnecessarily limiting scientific progress.

Biological Attribution

Gain of Fiction: How COVID Origins Motivated Defunding of U.S. Science

Defunding scientific research in the United States has halted disease cure studies amid multiple infectious crises By Gigi Kwik Gronvall

The Contested Origin of SARS-CoV-2

Gigi Kwik Gronvall, Pages 7-36 | Published online: 26 Nov 2021. This article describes what is known about the origin of SARS-CoV-2, with implications for policy, biological research and public-health surveillance. Theories about the origin include a natural emergence; a laboratory accident with a naturally harvested strain; an accident with a naturally harvested strain modified in a laboratory; and the deliberate creation of a biological weapon. While available scientific evidence points to a natural zoonotic event as the origin of SARS-CoV-2, this paper recommends specific steps governments and scientific institutions should take to address uncertainties about the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as to make all potential causes for a pandemic less likely to produce one in the future. Immediate steps include promoting international scientific collaboration, addressing scientific misinformation and disinformation, fully implementing ‘One Health’ and reining in the illegal wildlife trade.

A playbook on investigations into biological events of ambiguous origin

Kelsey Lane Warmbrod & Gigi Kwik Gronvall. We interviewed 41 experts in disciplines related to attribution and investigations and then analyzed the interview content using a mixed-methods approach. Interviews generated a list of factors to consider when planning or conducting investigations. Among the interviewees, opinions varied by field of study on how to analyze the biological samples, how to communicate the results of the investigation, and how feasible it would be to reach a conclusion about who was responsible. Participant opinions varied less with regard to requirements, protocols, and guidelines thought to be important to maintaining confidence in the technical details of an investigation and the evidence it produces. Findings from this study can inform planning for future events. Warmbrod, K. L., & Gronvall, G. K. (2023). A playbook on investigations into biological events of ambiguous origin. The Nonproliferation Review, 30(1–3), 61–81. https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2024.2383815

The Reemergent 1977 H1N1 Strain and the Gain-of-Function Debate

Michelle Rozo, Gigi Kwik Gronvall. We revisit the evidence that the 1977 epidemic was not natural and examine three potential origins: a laboratory accident, a live-vaccine trial escape, or deliberate release as a biological weapon. Based on available evidence, the 1977 strain was indeed too closely matched to decades-old strains to likely be a natural occurrence. While the origin of the outbreak cannot be conclusively determined without additional evidence, there are very plausible alternatives to the laboratory accident hypothesis, diminishing the relevance of the 1977 experience to the modern GOF debate.

International Security

International Cooperation & Assistance in the Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention: Strengthening BWC Assurance through ArticleX

Shearer, Matthew P. ; Vahey, Rachel A. ; Fogarty, Alanna S. ; Potter, Christina M. ; Gronvall, Gigi Kwik. Over the past 50 years, attention has intensified on Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) Article X, which obligates states parties to provide international cooperation and assistance (ICA) and ensure the broadest accessibility of biology for peaceful purposes. In the absence of a treaty protocol and institutional support, Article X’s scope of activities and standard for compliance remain up to the interpretation of each state party. The Ninth BWC Review Conference established the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention (Working Group) and mandated it to address ICA, including establishing a mechanism to facilitate Article X implementation. Utilizing a mixed-methods methodology, this study characterizes the landscape of Article X and ICA perspectives among BWC delegations and other stakeholders. It identifies concrete opportunities to strengthen Article X implementation, in support of the Working Group’s efforts, including a pillar framework to illustrate alignment across an ICA mechanism’s roles, activities, and resources. Politics and the life sciences, 2026-05, p.1-30

Diplomacy disrupted: A mixed-methods analysis of Russian disinformation at the Ninth Review Conference of the BWC

Sundelson AE, Gronvall GK, Ackerman G, Limaye R, Watson C, Sell TK. In 2022, Russia invoked Articles V and VI of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), requesting a formal meeting to discuss, and subsequent investigation of, alleged U.S.-funded biological weapons laboratories in Ukraine. Such allegations have been dismissed as false by scholars and diplomats alike, many of whom have argued that Russia’s actions represented an abuse of BTWC provisions and risked undermining the Convention. However, few scholars have assessed the implications of Russia’s ongoing efforts to level false allegations in BTWC meetings following the Article V and VI procedures. Using mixed-methods analysis of BTWC meeting recordings, transcripts, and documents, we assessed the volume, consequences, and framing of Russian false allegations at the BTWC Ninth Review Conference. Analysis revealed that discussion of Russian allegations took over three hours and contributed to a stunted Final Document. Additional potential consequences are discussed, including increased division among states parties and the erosion of nonproliferation norms. Politics and the Life Sciences. 2025;44(1):28-48